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The Professional
Decline of Physicians
in the Era of

Managed Care
Aimee

E.

Marlow

Physicians have long enjoyed prestige, power, and autonomy, but the rise of managed care organizations has drastically changed their status. Many doctors are in
thrall to the financial well-being of the corporations that employ them, their
knowledge and expertise controlled and manipulated in the interest of profit maximization. This article investigates the professional decline of physicians, citing the

and the breakdown of their authorsome measure of control, physicians have taken their
concerns to the public, supporting state and federal legislation that attempts to
curb questionable managed care practices, but this new alliance is unreliable. The
author evaluates the history and ultimate failure of California 's propositions 214
and 216, both created to protect patients and physicians. The results clearly suggest that physician influence alone can no longer sway public opinion.
use of gag clauses, incentives to withhold care,
ity.

In an effort to regain

Physicians,

facing deprofessionalization in the

new

corporate structure of medicine,

amount of power. Some no longer control the simplest
medical decisions, for example, what they may tell patients and what tests they may or
may not administer. The few who downplay the importance of such restrictions fail to
are losing a tremendous

1

recognize that "the fate of patients
attenuation of medical practice
sult

them. This

article

is

is tied to

2

the fate of doctors." In other words, the

an issue not only for physicians, but for

examines several of the myriad

all

who

con-

details regarding the state of U.S.

medicine.

What Is a Profession?
Sociologists have long studied the rise of U.S. professionalization, a product of the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which increased dramatically during and after
the Industrial Revolution, leading to growth of large bureaucracies. 3

As

society devel-

oped more complex structures, institutions flourished, and the need for experts and
leaders quickly became evident. 4 Technical training and leadership capabilities separated the professional from the lay person. 5 The literature of sociology acknowledges
that in aspiring to professionalization,

an occupation generally "strives to attain" the

following characteristics and goals:
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1.

Altruistic service to clients

2.

A

3.

Licensure by the state

and society:

basic liberal education followed

should be drawn up

.

.

[in].

.

.

The
.

by professional and

technical training;

and practice

criteria for licensure

.

.

.

consultation [with] practitioners representing

the profession.

judged by other professionals;

4.

The competence of professionals

5.

Professional practices continually directed by the body of theory and re-

6.

A

is

search relevant to the field; and

code of professional ethics

enforced by the profession

The

link

between

.

.

itself.

integrity, service,

six points, places a large responsibility

.

continually developed, corrected, and

6

and appreciation for knowledge, evident in

all

on members of an occupation

pro-

fessional status. Their reward for achieving success

the right "[of] freedom, not only to do his

but also to choose his

own

style

is great,

to

uphold

its

for the professional gains

work according to his own best judgment
economy of effort."" This model reflects

.

.

.

of work and

it should be and what most Americans expect it to be: an altruistic profesembodying integrity, autonomy, and ethical accountability.
Professional knowledge and theory are particularly important. Physicians, who traditionally rely on their interpretive wisdom to separate them from other professions, se-

medicine as
sion

cure a coveted niche in society as healers. Basic medical knowledge, a touchstone offer-

ing them a sense of the role they should play, serves to separate patient from physician.

We

trust physicians

with one of our most valued possessions, our health; their role en-

compasses strong "moral and social functions." 8 Everett Hughes notes

that, in general,

professions "also claim a broad legal, moral, and intellectual mandate." 9

He

adds,

"Not

only do the practitioners, by virtue of gaining admission to the charmed circle of the
profession, individually exercise a license to do things that others do, but collectively

they presume to
life."

10

tell

Medicine

society

fits this

what

mold

is

good and

right for

exactly. Physicians

it

in a

broad and crucial aspect of

and patients have a give-and-take

whose moral and intellectual obligathem from harm.
dominance, physicians met all the criteria noted above, benefiting first
changes in society and later from their collective power. Prior to gaining

relationship: patients give their trust to doctors,
tions, they are confident, will safeguard

In rising to

from

structural

authority in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth

centuries, doctors encountered a host

of obstacles. :: Without a scientifically sound body of knowledge and a lack of "unity
.

.

.

and collective

authority," physicians required grounding.

12

The

traditional

view of

dominated society aggravated the issue. Paul Starr writes, "Many Americans
already had a rationalist, activist orientation to disease refused to accept physicians

illness that

who

as authoritative.

effectively with

The

They believed that common sense and native intelligence could deal
most problems of health and illness:" 13

late nineteenth century,

greatly influenced the state of
tural revolution,"

their

a time of great cultural, scientific, and social change,
all

professions.

when "Americans became

dependence on professions."

1"

The United

States

embarked on a

"cul-

willing to acknowledge and institutionalize

In addition, the Industrial Revolution brought about

America and a new reliance on complex organizations with
hierarchical structures, which became comfortable and accepted. The term "professional" represented power, wealth, and advanced education, all qualities revered in
the urbanization of life in

societv.

as

Concurrently, physicians acquired the knowledge that granted them access to and

Advances

control over grounded scientific "evidence/*

strengthened

developed

powers ...

[their]

tests for "specific

.

in physical

.

in "'diagnostic

disease," and in the 1880s,

.

in tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid,

technology

.

.

.

examination of the patient." Science also
the organisms "responsible

and diphtheria were isolated"; by the 1890s, "labora-

tory tests had been introduced to detect [them]."

15

Thanks

and

to science

to society,

physicians started gaining power.

But other hindrances remained; structural changes came from within the profession
and physicians

lacked a strong collective society that could represent them.

at first

More troublesome was

the profession's lack of a "fixed track" for education; "whether

or not a physician went to medical school and
general education, were
tive

forms of treatment

16

variable."

all

like

if

he did. for

Such ambiguities

homeopathy and

eclectic

how

left

long and with what

plenty of

room

for alterna-

medicine to enter the market.

Even as late as 1900, "the ports of entry into medicine were still wide open and the
unwelcome passed through in great numbers." 17
The formation of the American Medical Association fAMA) in 1847 was an attempt
to give physicians an organizational foundation, but more important, the AMA sought
medical education with a view toward eliminating alternative medicine. 18

to standardize
Initially, the

organization suffered from internal conflict and lack of structure but re-

mained dedicated

-i

to [addressing] the

control of medical education."

which

cation,

19

set standards for

problem

that originally motivated

its

formation,

AMA formed the Council on Medical Edu-

In 1904 the

medical schools, including increasing the preparation

time necessary to become a doctor of medicine and mandating that

all

physicians pass

examinations before being allowed to practice.

state licensing

The 1906 Flexner committee,

in a report that investigated the country's

160 medical

schools, concluded that only 82 achieved adequate standards for medical education.

The best were encouraged

to

20

remain open, while the weaker would be closed or merge

with stronger institutions. This tremendous overhaul of the educational system "greatly
increased the homogeneity and cohesiveness of the profession [and] instilled
values and beliefs

among

doctors

.

.

.

and

.

.

.

common

discouraged sectarian divisions."

21

Standardization of medical education provided other benefits as well, enabling doctors to truly define the role of physician.

The

lines of distinction

and other health care professionals were changed
trapolates:

drawn between doctors
Hughes ex-

in the twentieth century.

"The elaboration of the organization of

hospitals, clinics,

and public-health

agencies combined with great technological change in medicine and an
crease in the

demand

immense

for medical services has led to a great reshuffling in the

in-

whole

medical system."- The reshuffling led to more power and autonomy for physicians. The
profession simply passed along certain duties, such as taking blood pressure or filing

forms, to other workers. 23 This served to set physicians even further apart, for menial,

time-consuming tasks were no longer their responsibility.

By

pushing forward and successfully taking advantage of the structural changes

occurring on the national level, physicians ascended to the professional ranks, continuing through the post-World

War

appeared, "making [medicine]
federal

money

for

sicians attained

The boom

new

II era.

more

The new advances

in scientific technology that

effective in treating illness."

were coupled with

2
hospitals and "the explosion of private health insurance.*' " Phy-

an unimaginable level of resources and wealth.

in the medical industry presented people with previously unirnagined
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many

prospects for making money;

physicians took advantage of the potential bonanza,

adding the role of businessman to their persona. 25 Investment opportunities took

many

was as lucrative as those offered by pharmaceuticals, an industry which
by the mid-1950s was worth $4.5 billion. 26 It seemed reasonable for physicians to invest in these companies, for as Howard Wolinsky and Tom Brune noted, "doctors knew
forms, but none

something about the drugs they prescribed." 27

But the public did not buy
realize that "doctors' clinical
ests."

28

this explanation. For the first time, people were forced
judgment [could be] influenced by their business inter-

to

Overwhelmingly, they rejected the physician as businessman. People were

and threatened by the thought

clearly uncomfortable

that doctors could

be persuaded to

prescribe the products of drug companies in which they had a financial interest rather

than

more appropriate medications. 29 Recognizing the

loss of public trust, the

AMA

denounced doctors' involvement with these organizations. In a further effort to polish
the tarnished image of physicians,
delegate Dr. Edwin B. Dunphy declared in
June 1952, "The medical profession is not a luxury business but a profession dedicated

AMA

to rendering service to humanity.
ation. Physicians

Reward or

should never lose sight of

financial gain

fession will certainly be government regulated eventually

public approval." 30

One might assume

is

this principle. If

that such

a subordinate consider-

they do, the medical pro-

and [emphasis added] with

bad publicity and public disapproval

would have deterred physicians from involving themselves in business ventures, but as
history tells us, it didn't. For the most part, corporate medicine found physicians to be
willing participants.

Evolution of For-Proflt

Dunphy had no
on

flecting

HMOs

inkling of the future of medicine and

his words,

one questions how

far

its

business alliances. Today, re-

medicine has come and

The success of physicians
Being positioned more than once in

if

the lessons of

the past taught anything.

in their pursuit of professionalism

involved luck.

history to take advantage of societal

changes

is

remarkable for any profession; the specific events noted above comprise a

few such fortuitous examples in the chronicles of physicians. But what is also evident
from Dunphy is that more than forty years ago, doctors, even when they held the upper
hand, feared a corporate threat to their integrity.

Modern

for-profit

HMOs

and corporate medicine do not offer physicians the power

to reject or dispute the corporations.
in the early 1980s. 31

Most

HMOs

theoretical purpose for existence

many people

to provide for as

Wendy Mariner

stated,

The managed care concept

first

gained popularity

maintained a nonprofit status until 1987, their main

based upon utilitarianism and rationalization, namely,

as possible quality health care at the least expense.

"The goals of managed care came

of health care resources ... to provide quality care." 32

By

to

be seen as the

As

efficient

1987, "there were 650

use

HMOs

with about 29 million members." 33
Early nonprofit

HMOs,

seemingly adhering to the original purpose, "encouraged

coordinate care, [including] preventive services, in long-term personal relationships

between patients and primary care providers." 34 Moving managed care into the competitive market and making it a for-profit industry apparently offered improved quality and
efficiency overall since "increased competition could achieve the goals [of] providing
35
The success of profit-making HMOs depended largely on physikeep a "foot in both the medical and the business camps" and its sucperforming "both medical and business functions, taking actions to provide or

good quality

care."

cians' ability to

cess in

90

withhold care that touches the traditional sphere of medicine, and,
acting like ordinary business enterprises with no moral obligation
tions that have

In the

little

to

do with

traditional

model under discussion, medical

When

the

same

time,

obliga-

medical ethics." 36
ethics and business concerns are accorded

equal priority. Although this was the intent of for-profit
reality.

at

or, at least,

HMOs,

it

was not borne out

faced with conflicts between providing "quality medical care and

HMOs

obligations to preserve their assets," profit-making

.

.

in

.

favored the needs of the cor-

37
Business concerns that "put profits before patients" are
poration, not the profession.

now

38
"the palpable force destroying care."

Recent Voices: Ignored but Prophetic

The

rise

of for-profit

HMOs

and the subsequent deprofessionalization of physicians

should not surprise Americans. Although

many people spend time and

effort evaluating

the present state of medicine, they fail to integrate one crucial piece of information:

physicians and sociologists predicted

all

of today's events more than ten years ago. The

most compelling prophecies were those of Paul Starr and Eliot Freidson, both medical
sociology experts, and George Lundberg, longtime editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association.
In the final chapter of The Social Transformation of American Medicine, Starr
painted a dreary picture of the future of American medicine.
the corporation, or "private sector,"

would

taking over faltering public institutions.

He

when

envisioned a time

step in to "rationalize" medical services,

As

corporations appropriated medicine,

new

challenges to physician autonomy and prestige would be inevitable, and in an extreme
case, "doctors will
retire."

39

One

no longer have as much power over such basic issues as when they

backlash of

namely, boundaries.

He

this trend also brings to light for Starr

another obstacle,

"Another key issue will be the boundary between medical

says,

and business decisions; when both medical and economic considerations are relevant,
which will prevail and who will decide? ... A regime of medical austerity will test the
40
limits of professional autonomy in the corporate world."
Also at issue, according to Starr, was the "different techniques for modifying the
behavior of physicians, getting them to accept the management's outlook." 41 Physicians
will

be "socialized" not merely

things the

But

his

way

as doctors but as corporate

company has them done." 42
vision of the future seemed to be

spokesmen, learning "to do

the plan or the

most

chilling

the

most prophetic.

Starr

believed that the medical profession's and the public's complete inability to control the
situation

was an

invitation to corporations to turn

medicine into a for-profit industry.

"Instead of public financing for prepaid plans," he wrote, "there will be corporate

nancing for private plans

.

.

.

whose

interests will

be determined by the

fi-

rate of return

on

investments." 43

Freidson also feared for the future of medicine.

He

too recognized the emergence of

the corporation as the biggest threat to the profession and,

more

specifically, turned

attention to the detrimental role of inducements to cut health care costs. Freidson as-

serted that "considerably less emphasis

the spirit in

which

on economic incentives would greatly improve

practitioners approach their work."

44

More

idealistic than Starr,

believed that a "greater emphasis on professional values" would be the only

American physicians. 45
the medical community would face a

way

he

to

repair the ailing reputation of

Freidson predicted that

91

"critical choice" that
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would determine the

"We

future.

can passively accept a health care system

that, in the

interest of cost containment, slowly moves toward mechanizing and bureaucratizing
[is] designed to do
services. Or we can actively choose to struggle for a system that
.

everything

it

can to improve the unique

lots

of

all

those

who need

.

.

help."

46

The

first

choice has "physicians and health care workers [following] elaborate rules of procedure" and "patients [as] standardized objects," while the second focuses on "truly hu-

man

health services."

47

In closing, Freidson takes issue with the

way

the industrialization of medicine will

inevitably lead to "the loss of something precious" for both physicians

Within a mechanized health care system, doctors "will have

and

patients.

do

lost the opportunity to

autonomous, challenging, and creative work" and patients will "lose the opportunity
regain

.

.

.

their full potential."

commu-

Sociologists were not alone in addressing the problems facing the medical
nity

and physicians. In a 1985

how "we,

focusing on

public at large."

or personal

49

trust.

to

48

Lundberg lashed out

editorial,

at his

own

profession,

the aggregate medical profession, are in big trouble with the

The problems he

reports surround the issue of trust, but not technical
is patients who do not trust phy"Never in modern history has the medical

Rather, he believes that the real issue

sicians economically or morally.

He

states,

profession been weaker ... To a great extent, physicians are becoming seen as highly
successful businessmen
professional ethic

.

.

who

We

.

are functioning with the business ethic rather than the

are

viewed by many

as a restrictive cartel."

50

Thus, industrial-

izing medicine has bankrupted the profession of any morality. In this scenario, both

physicians and patients pay.

Lundberg

substantiates this point

by

citing longitudinal data that reflected a severe

decline in patients' trust of physicians, specifically in the area of money. "In 1982,

42%

of the public queried expressed the opinion that physician fees were reasonable. This
declined 15 points to

27%

in 1984, a

shocking change." 51

As an

insider in the medical profession, Lundberg, is critical of the conflict of interbetween the physician as businessperson and the physician as healer. He offers various solutions to the problems at hand, calling on doctors to "reestablish the fact that
as physicians, we will represent the best interests of our patients and the public." 52
Changing their image was not enough; Lundberg challenged physicians to "change
est

.

reality,

thereby becoming viewed as primarily proactive rather than reactive

.

.

.

.

.

pro-

moting rather than opposing progress." 53
In financial matters,

Lundberg implored

"financial circumstances," to adjust

all

payment

physicians to be aware of each person's

to

need when necessary.

the need for physicians to take a "leadership position" in cost

He emphasized

management and

contain-

ment and to be "intolerant of devious cost shifting and of questionable creative account54
ing." Above all, physicians "should promote openness and full disclosure of facts
because the truth is more central to medical science and to the practice of medicine
than any other

human

endeavor." 55

Lundberg's conclusions provided room for hope, positive change, and the possibility
of a bright future, but

it

was

all

contingent on physicians' reverting to "caring for the

public," choosing altruism over greed,

So

far doctors

have failed to

professional point of view,
cratic oath,

which

and taking a stand against unethical practices. 56

rise to the occasion.

it

asserts "that physicians

in their patients' interests; (3)

Why

is

that so important?

means no more than successfully adhering

make

have duties to

(1)

be loyal

a

Hippo-

to patients; (2) act

their patients their first consideration,

92

From

to the

even

when

their

own

financial well-being

accepted experts of the
death.

We

is

opposed." 57 Physicians

body working

in

more than

are,

just technicians,

an American society obsessed with

and

life

expect a social contract in which the professional physician serves us as ef-

fectively as possible.

Declining Power and Prestige

The

American medicine are

shifts in

which

clearly leading to physicians' losing power,

results in deprofessionalization. In the six criteria for all professions, profit-making

HMOs

rob physicians of their ability (1) to be "altruistic servants," as indicated by the

role of monetary incentives to reduce treatment; (2) to have their

work and competence

judged by other physicians, because the very structure of managed care works against
camaraderie and collective activity; and most important, (3) to use medical knowledge
to its fullest in a variety of contexts, for their authority

and autonomy are tempered by

gag clauses in managed care contracts, which determine what physicians can and cannot

patients

tell their

and the public.

Many who

Altruism has long been a tenet of the medical profession.

speak of "the

58
the need to help others and to save lives.

call,"

The

enter the field

and mission of

ethics

medicine encourage nothing less than physicians doing everything possible to help
patients, but for-profit

HMOs

remove

this crucial

element by establishing financial

incentives for physicians to reduce services.

Managed

care corporations introduced incentives only a few years ago, recognizing

that "other approaches, such as administrative monitoring

and penalties for overuse

[were] less effective" in curbing physicians from excessively offering or wasting resources.

59

There are obvious flaws

in this reasoning according to

incentives to provide services cause physicians to use too

form unnecessary procedures, would not incentives
services?

.

.

.

How

can

we

many

Marc Rodwin.

"If

resources and to per-

to reduce services result in too

few

be sure physicians will reduce only unnecessary or wasteful

services?" 60

Financial incentives are wrapped in various packages. In their most blatant form,

they deter physicians from administering expensive diagnostic

HMOs

tests.

61

In another form,

"significantly reduce hospitalization," often forcing patients out the door after

major surgery. 62, 63

A

incentives. In 1995,

large proportion of a physician's salary

"74%

group-model or staff-model
utilization

and

cost."

64

may be

of independent-practice association

HMOs

[based] physicians'

In doing so, such for-profit

HMOs

payment

managed

contingent on such

and

in part

of

care organizations as

Healthcare bind "primary care physicians' interests to [those of] the [firm]
is

50%

on measures of

.

.

.

US

Income

tethered to conduct that furthers corporate profitability." 65 Physicians are rewarded,

"sometimes quite
interest."

66

directly, for

doing

less for their patients,"

This cuts to the very heart of the

altruistic nature

an "inherent conflict of
of the profession, calling

into question the moral and ethical implications of such activity.

The

declining importance of altruism

is

related to

how and by whom

physicians are

judged. Doctors have long enjoyed the ability to oversee their profession's educational
standards, ethical codes, and the opportunity to rate

formance review

is

of specific concern. Physicians working within the for-profit

structure find that the quality of their
titioners,

one another's performance. 67 Per-

work

is

based not on their

ability to

HMO

be good prac-

providing excellent care and developing trust with patients, but on their ability

to cut costs

and generate

returns.

93
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The system of

Policy

for-profit

HMO denies physicians the opportunity to foster relation-

ships not only with patients but with other physicians.

cine includes a loose collection of physicians

same

entity.

Thus, some

HMOs

are

The new wave of corporate medi-

who work

in various locations for the

composed not of "a core of dedicated

staff' but

of

68
"networks and private practitioners linked by part-time contracts." Solidarity among

physicians

impossible in an arrangement that has "forced practitioners to reorganize

is

into larger units."
ity

of care an

69

Such an elaborate

intricate, at

structure

makes measuring performance and

qual-

times frustrating experience.

These issues are important indicators of the deprofessionalization of medicine. Yet
the control of medical knowledge through the restrictions is the most solid, telling
gauge of the

trend.

The value of medical knowledge and the

public's trust in

nificant element in the physician-patient relationship. Placing a high value

edge presumably upholds the

But

in the

new design

of

and

"legal, moral,

managed

intellectual

care, expertise

it is

a sig-

on knowl-

mandate" of medicine. 70

and knowledge are exploited and

good of the corporation, perhaps best exemplified by the use of gag
all of which potentially impose
constraints on the physician-patient relationship and on doctors' overall autonomy. The
clauses, to which physicians have to agree, are written into their contracts with managed care organizations. Gag clauses eliminate alternative treatments that the managed
care organizations view as unnecessary or inappropriate for any number of medical
conditions. Physicians who defy these stipulations face, at the least, reprimands, and at
controlled for the

clauses or rules. Generally, these take several forms,

the most, dismissal.

Legal experts identify four types of gag rules, the

first

[on] doctor-patient discussion of treatment alternatives."
hibit physicians

from "disclosing treatment options

71

of which places "restrictions

The rules specifically pro[managed care organiza-

that the

determines are inappropriate." 72 This restriction declares that physicians

tion]

may

not

discuss alternative treatments with a patient "until the plan has agreed to pay for

them" 73 and gives

may

its

approval. If the corporation

deems them

unsuitable, physicians

not reveal an alternative to the patients.

This type of clause also prohibits physicians from "making statements to patients
that

would undermine the

patient's confidence in the

with an organization's actions

may

reporting that the plan will not cover

it,

A

who

disagrees

may be

beneficial or even life-saving, but

The

physician, unable to share

all

treatment

feel trapped.

second type of gag clause prevents physicians from "discussing conflicts of

est with patients."

ciation with the

how

doctor

could be construed as disparaging or as suggest-

ing that the plan offers substandard care." 75

may

A

not reveal his or her opinion to a patient. In addi-

tion, "suggesting that a course of treatment

options with the patient,

[HMO]." 74

76

A

doctor

managed

may

care organization.

they are paid, for this

is

inter-

not reveal the terms of his or her agreement of asso-

Most

important, physicians cannot reveal

considered a "business secret requiring protection." 77 They

cannot bare the fact that the amount of their paycheck

—

is,

to a large extent, contingent

on the treatment options they choose for patients
less treatment translates to larger
salary
which could negatively affect a patient's health.
Another gag clause restricts doctors' ability to recommend facilities where patients

—

can receive treatment outside their care organization. Physicians are forbidden to recommend "uncovered treatments" even if they believe such alternatives could help their
patients" 78 This rule also prevents physicians

aged care organizations or "offering

from giving advice on the nature of manon what plans are better for

their perspective

94

some of

patients in general, or [one] patient in particular"; therefore,

their expertise is

denied to patients. 79

A

final

gag rule precludes physicians from publicly "making negative comments

about the plan" with which they are associated. 80
the public debate on

managed

It

serves to keep physicians silent in

care, for they are "unable to offer candidly their experi-

ences and expertise to patients and political debates alike." 81 Public discussion

promised by the denial of a voice to these eminent

The nationwide debates on

is

com-

actors.

the subject of gag clauses

grow more heated

guises" them, the clauses are sometimes difficult to locate in

as these

vague language

stipulations are gradually leaked to the public. Yet because of

managed

that "dis-

care contracts.

Additionally, a "lack of any [nationwide] centralized clearinghouse for contract infor-

mation" that monitors

all

managed

care contracts

makes the search even more cumber-

some. 82 This scarcity of information adds controversy

managed
tracts,

to the mixture.

Proponents of

care organizations deny the very existence of such clauses in physicians' con-

claiming that the agreements are fashioned with patient protection in mind. Op-

ponents

insist that these clauses are

commonplace,

that they blatantly "violate the

physician's ethical duties," and that they must be outlawed immediately. 83

Controversy aside, the very notion of gag clauses leads to disturbing conclusions
about this method of cost cutting. Such rules directly threaten the welfare of patients by
controlling the use of medical knowledge.
relationship

They "threaten

to erode the doctor-patient

by silencing physicians and keeping patients uninformed." 84 They

raise

important legal, ethical, and even constitutional questions. Legally, they pose dilemmas
specifically

around the doctrine of informed consent: patients "should be autonomous

over their bodies, which requires that physicians inform patients of their conditions and
options for treatment." 85 According to the doctrine, a doctor must inform a patient of
alternatives.

As previously

tion violate the doctrine of

informed consent. "Gag clauses that prohibit physician

closure of uncovered treatment threaten to turn back the clock to a time

were kept uninformed of

all

noted, rules that do not allow for full disclosure of informa-

their alternatives

when

dis-

patients

and physicians made treatment decisions

without regard to the patient's concern." 86
Failing to adhere to the doctrine of informed consent suggests that, legally, physicians are not doing their job,
tice.

to

87

Ethically,

which can leave them wide open

gag clauses place physicians in potentially

to charges of malprac-

difficult situations,

unable

"advance the patient's health," the overarching goal of medicine. 88 Ethics seems to

new

run a distant second to profit maximization in the

John McArthur and Francis Moore write,
seeks profit by selling
agents. Professional

[its]

"When

calling of corporate medicine.

a corporation employing physicians

services, the physician-employees cease to act as free

commitment

to patient care is

now

subordinated to

new

rules of

practice that assure profitability of the corporation." 89

Another important consideration
rights of doctors

by withdrawing

physicians' voices out of the public

terms

is

US

the way gag clauses threaten constitutional
freedom of speech. 90 Some forcibly keep

domain on health care

issues,

cause for the dismissal of doctors. Therefore, "a gag rule

loss of free speech, not

rations."

is

their

by order of public law, but by the

and violation of these
is

an example of the

dictates of health care corpo-

91

Healthcare, one of the nation's largest for-profit

HMO corporations, provides an

excellent example of manipulation through gag rules. In 1995

members, earning a

profit of $1 million a day.

92

95

Steffie

it

cared for 2.4 million

Woolhandler and David
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Himmelstein note the following clauses from a

US

"Physicians shall agree not to take any action or

Healthcare contract with one

HMO.

make any communication which

un-

dermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees, potential enrollees, their
employers, their unions, or the public in

coverage

.

.

.

US

Healthcare or the quality of

US

Healthcare

Physicians shall keep the Proprietary Information [payment rates, utiliza-

93
tion-review procedures, and so on] and this Agreement strictly confidential." Trans-

lated, these clauses state that physicians

any ground and that any cost the

cannot openly disagree with

US

Healthcare on

HMO assumes or does not assume must not be dis-

closed to the patient.
In addition, releasing an

employee who disagrees with company policy

is

also part of

the reality. After coauthoring "Extreme Risk," and speaking out against certain

HMO

on national talk shows, David Himmelstein, "on December 1, 1995, received
94
notice from US Healthcare of his termination."
Gag clauses, which reduce the value of a physician's knowledge to monetary terms,
deleting moral and intellectual components from the picture, are only one of several
questionable tactics created by managed care corporations whose primary concern is
profit realization. In an effort to combat corporate control, more and more physicians
are turning to the public for support, a move that has both positive and negative effects.
On the positive side, physicians and patients working together represent increased
people power and increased opportunity for physicians to educate the public about the
policy can generate. For example, many profespotential harm profit-making
sional doctors organizations have produced offspring in the form of patient organizations. Physicians Who Care, a group of more than 30,000 doctors, is allied with the
policies

HMO

15,000 members of Patients

Who

Care.

Yet bringing concerns to the public and inviting citizens to join forces with them has
not necessarily resulted in success for the physicians. They face the fact that quality
health care alone

may

not be enough to sway public opinion. Indeed, physicians place

themselves in the position of having to deal with countervailing modes of influence.

The

history of propositions

unethical

managed

214 and 216, two proposals aimed

at

ending unfair and

care practices in the state of California, are prime examples of this

phenomenon. Both propositions, introduced as precursors to the creation of the Health
Care Patient Protection Act of 1996, called for the following measures, reported in the
Fall 1996 Physicians Who Care Newsletter.
A. Banning

all

written gag clauses;

B. Outlawing financial bonuses tied to the denial of necessary care;
C. [Giving] patients the right to [pursue] a second opinion before denying

doctor-recommended care and [publicizing]

HMO guidelines for denying

treatment;

D. Requiring "just cause" for [terminating services] of physicians and other
professionals. 95

more radical of the initiatives, also added clauses that included
consumer watchdog organization, and [imposing] taxes on health-care

Proposition 216, the
establishing "a

mergers and acquisitions, hospital closures, and bed reductions." 96

The goals of both propositions
tients

offered something for everyone. Not only would pabe protected against financial incentives that may influence a physician's quality

of care, but the doctors themselves would be free from the threat of the gag clauses that
silence them.

Both measures gained huge support from more than

96

1

50

interest

groups

and individuals on the

and national

state

ing the Patient Protection Act

is

level. Activist

the single

most

Ralph Nader proclaimed, "Passyear for

critical health care battle this

California and as an example for the rest of the nation.

.

.

.

The

denial of care, gag rules

97
for doctors and nurses ... are a national scandal."

It is

"new

also important to realize that neither proposition called for

taxes, litiga-

98
Considering the propositions' comprehensive protion, or government agencies."

grams,

it

on

failed

was almost impossible

to

imagine the public's not passing them. Yet both

even with the support of thousands of physicians and ordinary

the ballot,

citi-

conducted days before the election, 46 percent of the 824

zens nationwide. In a poll

people surveyed indicated that they would vote against both propositions, while an
additional 25 percent and 26 percent remained undecided about
tively.

99

On

percent.

A

100

perplexing question

California, a state with
in

214 and 216, respec-

Election Day, 214 failed by a ratio of 58 to 42 percent, and 216 by 61 to 39

HMOs,

is

central to

examining the

more than 30 million

failure:

How

could the citizens of

residents, 58 percent of

whom

are enrolled

vote against propositions so clearly designed to protect them from unethical

managed care? Some groups, Taxpayers Against Higher Health

Costs, for example,

interpreted the defeat as an indication that "Californians [were saying] no to

ernment involvement in health

care,"

which

antigovernment sentiment. 101 Health care reform appears to be unnecessary
provides checks and balances as

"Those opposed
[us]

to

needed care

dencies."

.

[managed

.

if

the market

One opponent of the propositions stated,
we will suffer as soulless bean counters deny

should.

care] think

But free-market capitalism creates a powerful check on such

.

ten-

102

Another explanation points
sitions.

it

more gov-

reflects today's probusiness, promarket,

When

to the lack of voter understanding surrounding the propo-

asked specifics about each proposition in a preelection

answers reflected "confusion about what

lighted an overall general confusion about

The media's

poll, respondents'

what and what each would do" and high-

is

managed

care.

103

role in the failure offers a further possibility.

The proponents of these

proposals, physicians included, were unsuccessful in transmitting the message that forprofit

managed

tives,

pose a legitimate threat to the health and well-being of patients. The print media

care organizations, through the use of gag rules and unethical incen-

opposed the propositions. Editorials

mended

a no vote on both. 104

nothing back in

its

attack.

It

The

in fifty

major newspapers across California recom-

state's largest

newspaper, The Los Angeles Times, held

recognized the "[legitimate] problems"of the

but stood firmly for the rights of the corporation. In
the Times concluded,

"They

[are] fuzzily

worded

its

HMO

system

evaluation of the propositions,

provisions.

Both

[for

example]

try to

eliminate gag rules by allowing caregivers to disclose information 'relevant to the patients' health care.'

While physicians are

certainly entitled to

aged care companies should be able to impose some

freedom of speech, manFocusing on the need

restrictions."

to contain costs, the editorial further declared that the propositions

managed

care companies,

making

it

difficult to effect the

"would

tie

the

nimble balance between

quality and cost effectiveness." 105

In sheer numbers and ability to reach and educate the public, the battle for power
between a media supporting managed care organizations in California and physicians

desiring to change unethical policies

is really no contest. Yet in appealing to the public
must face the media as well as such other forces as antigovernsway opinions. If propositions 214 and 216 suggest anything, it is

for support, physicians

ment sentiment

that

97
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overcome the many powers that influence the
they are "pushed and pulled from all directions

that physicians collectively cannot

public.

On

in the

managed

the subject of

debate

.

.

.

care,

and are likely to remain neutralized." 106

Finding a Solution for the Future
Several issues emerge from the foregoing. First,
lieve otherwise, they

have for decades had

much

to grapple

as physicians

would

like to be-

with finding a niche in their pro-

One must realize that although the public never
was often frightened and threatened by it, the profession
in its attempts to embrace it. Because their professional status and power aldoctors could manipulate the public and control the interference of corpora-

fessional role for the businessperson.

approved of
persisted

lowed

it,

this

new

and business

tions

Now

in their work.

that physicians

have nowhere to

some

role and

state

turn.

need help

in reclaiming their professional power, they appear to

Corporate takeovers are

still

rampant

and although

in medicine,

and federal legislation has managed to ban a number of unethical incentives

and gag clauses, problems

persist.

Americans should be deeply concerned about the

managed

deprofessionalization of medicine and the dangers associated with "bad

care,

investor-owned, for-profit entities operated by insurance companies and managers with
little

or no experience in health care delivery," but confusion and lack of awareness

distance

them from the

issues.

107

Attempting to dismantle managed care

model of medicine

care

managed

is

is

not an appropriate solution

apparently here to stay.

—

The number of people

in

managed
some sort of

the

care arrangement increases every year. For example, "In 1995, 54 million

Americans were enrolled in health maintenance organizations and as many as 130 mil108
lion [were] insured in one or another form of managed care."
This number represents
109
Therefore, abandoning the managed care conan increase of 13 percent from 1994.
cept

is

currently not practical or possible.

To accomplish anything, physicians must come

to grips with their position rather

than ignoring indicators that suggest the decline of their professional status.

As Freidson

and Lundberg asserted years ago, they must focus on the original goals of their profession, primarily patient advocacy. Furthermore, unless doctors resist the businessperson

which

always undermined them, their autonomy will vanish.
which medical knowledge, and its use and distribution, is controlled by businesspeople. As this occurs, patients will suffer and continue to lose faith
in physicians, widening an already large rift between the two camps.
The success or failure of physicians and patients in regaining control of health care
will depend largely on the degree of willingness of all parties to be radical and progressive. Specifically, physicians must be ready and willing to work with the public and
other health care professionals to effect change. As Woolhandler and Himmelstein assert, "We must scale care to a human size
Unless HMO physicians, workers, and
patients are centrally involved in planning this transformation, and the movement for
mentality,

We

historically has

will enter an era in

.

reform,

it

.

.

will surely fail." 110

Glimmers of

and

coming

For
formed
"from the merger of the American Group Practice Association and the Unified Medical
Group Association." 111 This new confederation of more than 350 group practice associations, which brings together administrators, physicians, and patients, states that its
this mentality

its

possible benefits are

example, in June 1996 the American Medical Group Association

98

to the surface.

(AMGA) was

.

primary goals include serving as "an information resource for group practice administrators

and as an advocacy group for physician decision-making and managed care

re-

form."" 2 The group also plans to continue to build upon a "patient-centered outcomes
database," thus creating for patients a "sounding board" on which they can voice their

concerns and rate their quality of care. 113

The birth of the AMGA is certainly an encouraging sign, but for real change to oca more radical approach is necessary. I suggest that the American Medical Association become the organization that unifies patients, physicians, and other health care
workers in their battle against corporate medicine. The AMA already identifies itself as
cur,

"a grassroots organization

AMA is

has served as a national leader in efforts to extend

[that]

and improve the quality of the American health care system. The

access, contain costs,

extremely active in public health campaigns, working vigorously for healthy

lifestyles."

114

indeed the mission of the

If this is

a stand against the corruptive nature of so

Wolinsky and
and in

Tom Brune

report, the

interest."

.

.

Rather,

.

AMA has never truly

HMOs,

Howard

but as

attempted to help patients,

political lobbies [not] to protect

has worked hard to look after physician income and

it

In the health care crisis sweeping the nation, the

without

role. It could,

much

Advocate socially responsible investing
tives

AMA has the potential to play

a

internal turmoil, undertake the following:

their stock portfolios of profit-making

2.

should have no problem taking

115

tremendous

1

it

for-profit

one of the "most powerful

fact billed itself as

our rights as patients

AMA,

many

— encourage people
HMOs

to divest

that use financial incen-

and gag clauses.

Support any

state or federal legislation that

encourages increased patient

and physician protection, such as propositions 214 and 216, providing
funds and manpower for campaigns.
3.

Launch a national

HMO awareness campaign — flood the media with in

formation concerning gag clauses and other pros and cons of managed
care.
4.

Develop a code of

ethics for all

managed

care corporations, creating an

obtainable balance between business concerns and medical ethics.
5.

Change medical school curricula to include a mandatory internship in
managed care setting for all students. As of now, only 16 percent of

a

schools have this requirement. 116
6.

Create a patient organization that works closely with other
in

7. Invite patients to

monitor
8.

AMA groups

advocacy projects.
serve on patient-physician committees designed to

activities

of the

many

large for-profit

Provide financial support to patients

who

HMOs.

rightfully sue

HMOs

for

breach of contract or malpractice.

More

radically, the

AMA could use

its

vast resources to support

organizations, such as Health Care for All of Boston,

who

many

which attempt

grassroots

to provide quality

it. The possibilities are endless.
window of opportunity for someone to step up to
the plate and provide the vision that can eliminate many of the current [health care]
dilemmas." 117 I believe that the AMA can accomplish this task. It comes down to the

medical care to those

Robert Larsen

states,

cannot afford

"There

is

a

99

—

.
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organization's willingness to change reality, not simply an image, as
gested.

The American Medical
Only time

Until then,
does not become progressively worse. **
call or retreat?

/ extend special thanks to

their

comments on

will

Lundberg sugit meet the

Association stands ready to deliver, but will
tell.

we have

to wait,

hoping that the situation

Professor Jeanne Guillemin and Professor Ritchie Lowry for

earlier drafts of this work.

Notes
1.

S.

Woolhandlerand

for Physicians,

D.

Himmelstein, Extreme Risk The New Corporate Proposition
of Medicine 333, no. 25 (December 95):1706

New England Journal

1708.
2.

3.

Freidson, Medical Work in America: Essays on Health Care (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1989).
P. Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books,
E.

1982).
4.

5.

Hughes, On Work, Race, and the Sociological Imagination (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994).
Since it is impossible to do justice here to the vast sociological literature on profesdecided to use Cogan s breakdown because it seemed to be the most
sions,
succinct and provided an excellent framework for the arguments posed later (M.
Cogan, Toward a Definition of Profession, Harvard Educational Review23 [1953]:
E.

I

48—49).
Cogan in

7.

R. Lowry, A Guide to Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1972), 464.
Hughes, The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers (New Brunswick and London:
Transaction Books, 1984), 372.

8.

Ibid.,

9.

Ibid.

6.

E.

288.

10.

Ibid.

1 1

Starr,

12.

Ibid.

13.

Ibid.

14.

Ibid.

15.

Ibid.,

16.

Ibid., 89.

The Social Transformation of American Medicine,

17.

137.

17.

Ibid., 117.

18.

J.

G. Burrows,

AMA — Voice of American Medicine^ Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-

sity Press, 1963).

The Social Transformation of American Medicine,

19.

Starr,

20.

Ibid.

21.

Ibid.,

22.

Hughes, The Sociological Eye, 293.

23.

Ibid.

24.

H.

112.

123.

Wolinsky and T. Brune, The Serpent on the Staff (New York: Tarcher/Putnam
Books, 1994), 97.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 98.
27. Ibid.

The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing
Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law 22, no. 2
29. Wolinsky and Brune, The Serpent on the Staff, 97.

28. D. Stone,

Politics of a Cultural Icon,
(April 1997): 545.

30. Ibid., 98.

31.
32.

Woolhandlerand Himmelstein, Extreme Risk.
W. K. Mariner, Business vs. Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards

100

for

Managed

Care,

—

.

Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 23, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 237.
Power: The Changing Character of the Medical Profession in
the United States, Perspectives in Medical Sociology, ed. Phil Brown, 2"- ed. (Pros-

33. D. Light, Countervailing

pect Heights,

III.:

Waveland

Business

34. Mariner,

vs.

Press, 1996), 661.

Medical Ethics, 236.

35. Ibid., 237.
36. Ibid., 238.
37. Ibid.
38. S.

Woolhandlerand

Giant
39. Starr,

HMO

B

?

in

D. Himmelstein, Galloping Toward Oligopoly: Giant
Perspectives in Medical Sociology, 491.

HMO A

or

The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 446.

40. Ibid., 447.
41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., 448.
43. Ibid., 449.

Medical Work

44. Freidson,

in

America, 260.

45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 264.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.

—

Lundberg, Medicine
A Profession in Trouble? Journal of the American
Medical Association 253, no. 19 (May 1985): 2879.

49. G. D.

50. Ibid.

Lundberg is referring to statistics generated from data collected by the American
Medical Association s Council on Long Range Planning and Development, 1984.
52. Lundberg, Medicine
A Profession in Trouble? 2880.
51

—

53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57.

M. Rodwin, Conflicts

in

Managed

Care,

New England Journal of Medicine 332, no.

9 (March 1995): 607.
58.
59.

AM

Burrows,
A.
M. A. Rodwin, Medicine, Money, and Morals: Physician s Conflict of Interest (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press ,1993), 155.

60. Ibid.

63.

Woolhandlerand Himmelstein, Extreme Risk.
Rodwin, Medicine, Money, and Morals. 104
Recently state and federal legislation has attempted to put a halt to this practice. See
a detailed account in F. Hellinger, The Expanding Scope of State Legislation,
Journal of the American Medical Association 276, no. 13 (October 2, 1996): 1065

64.

Woolhandlerand Himmelstein, Extreme

61.
62.

1069.
Risk, 1706.

65. Ibid.
66.

M. Angell and
Elephants,

67. Starr,

J. P.

—

and the Medical Marketplace
Following
of Medicine 335, no. 12 (September 1996), 884.

Kassirer, Quality

New England Journal

The Social Transformation of American Medicine.
Power, 662.

68. Light, Countervailing
69. Ibid.

70.

Hughes, The Sociological Eye, 288.
and L. K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag Clauses in
Physician Contracts, American Journal of Law and Medicine 22, no. 4 (1996): 443.

71. J. A. Martin

72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., 444.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., 446.

77. Ibid.

101

—
New England Journal

of Public Policy

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 448.
81. Ibid.
82. H.

Brody and

Alexander, Gag Rules and Trade Secrets in Managed Care Conand Legal Concerns, Archives of Internal Medicine 157 (October

E.

tracts: Ethical

1997): 2039.
83. N.J. Picinic, Physicians,

Care
620.

s

84. Martin

Use

of

Gag

Bound and Gagged: Federal Attempts to Combat Managed

Clauses,

Sefon Hall Legislative Journal 21 (Winter 1997): 567

and Bjerknes, Legal and

Ethical Implications, 449.

85. Ibid., 450.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.

88.

Brody and Alexander, Gag Rules and Trade Secrets, 2039.
McArthur and F. D. Moore, The Two Cultures and the Health Care Revolution:
Commerce and Professionalism in Medical Care, Journal of the American Medical
Association 277, no. 12 (March 1997): 986.

89. A. H.

90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92.

Woolhandlerand Himmelstein, Extreme

Risk, 1706.

93. Ibid.
94.

96.

Medicine and Health B0 (January 1996).

Gag Rule Gets Himmelstein, He Says,

95. Physicians
R. L.

Who

Rundle and

Care Newsletter,
L.

Mc

Fall

1996,

Comment@pwc.org.

Ginley, California Voters Are Cool to Hot

HMO

Issue,

Wall

Street Journal, October 31, 1996, B1, B12.
97. G.

D Andrea,

BNA

s

Patient Protection Acts Evolve from

Managed Care Reporter 26

AMA Model, But Issues Endure,

(1996): 426.

98. Ibid.
99.

Rundle and

Mc

Ginley, California Voters Are Cool, B1.

100. R. Sabin, Propositions 214,

November

7,

216 Failed

to

Tap Outrage,

San Francisco Chronicle,

1996, A19.

Again Reject Reform Proposals, BNA s Managed Care Reporter 26 (November 12, 1996): 1084.
102. S. Chapman, Refusing to Be Scared of Managed Care,
Chicago Tribune, November
10, 1996, 23.
103. Rundle and Mc Ginley, California Voters Are Cool, B12.
104. Business wire, November 5, 1996.
1 05. Los Angeles Times, Metro section, November 6, 1996, B6.
106. Sabin, Propositions 214 and 216 Failed, A19.
107. Mariner, Business vs. Medical Ethics, 236.
1 08. D. Blumenthal and S. Thier,
Managed Care and Medical Education
The New
Fundamentals, Journal of the American Medical Association 276, no. 9 (September
1996): 726.
109. P. Busowski, Managed Care Enrollment Up 13 Percent to 150 Million in 1995, AAHP
Survey Finds, BNA s Managed Care Reporter 26 (June 26, 1996): 776—777.
110. Woolhandlerand Himmelstein, Galloping Toward Oligopoly, 494.
111. Group Practice Association Merge to Represent 350 Organizations, BNA s Managed
Care Reporter 26 (June 26, 1996): 626.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. From the AMA home page, Membership@Web.ama.assn.org
115. Wolinsky and Brune, The Serpent on the Staff, 3.
116. J. Veloski et al., Medical Student Education in Managed Care Settings, Journal of
the American Medical Association 276, no. 9 (September 1996): 661
667.
117. R. Larson, Health Care: Whose Business Is It?
Postgraduate Medicine 99, no. 2
(February 1996): 21.
101. Voters

—

—

102

